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Abstract 
The article deals with an investigation of principles, factors, and conditions of 
the government tax behaviour by changing the tax rate. The research base is all 
countries in the world for which statistics are available. 
We define a set of potential indicators of the economic efficiency, based on 
GDP and FDI, nominal and per capita, as well as the ratio of FDI to GDP. By using 
the statistical analysis techniques we found a correlation between government 
behaviour and each of the selected indicators. In order to reduce the randomness of 
the results, we carry out cumulative testing of the hypothesis of independence of 
government tax behaviour from the efficiency of the economy for all possible 
partitions of the countries' totality with different interrelations of the countries’ sets 
behaviour with different economic efficiency levels. 
Based on the research, it can be argued that government tax behaviour, in 
general, is not maximizer behaviour. We argue that the factors GDP, FDI, and GDP 
per capita have the biggest impact on the government tax decisions. The obtained 
results allow to understand the principles of governments’ decision-making, and, 
therefore, to forecast in some way their behaviour in certain economic conditions. In 
particular, partitions accumulations can help identify behavioural trends. 
The present paper differs from previous studies both by the topic, studying the 
relations between government’s tax behaviour and efficiency of countries' economies 
and by the approach to define this dependence, since the latest can be observed only 
when each variant of government’s tax reaction is analyzed separately. 
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 Introduction 
The research is directed toward an investigation of principles of government 
economic behaviour. More precisely, her object of research is the use of the tax 
burden to regulate the economy. As is known ones of the main functions of taxes are 
fiscal function, when the government collects taxes in order to fulfill the budget for 
providing its own economic and social policy, and also regulatory function, 
consisting in the adjustment of the state’s economic policy and of appropriate 
economic relations. 
The research of tax behaviour of governments cover in fiscal direction the 
problems of budgeting, issues of optimal taxation rate for maximizing of budget 
revenue (see e.g. Mirrlees, 1971, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972, Aiyagari et al, 2002). 
On the other hand, in the area of economy’s regulation research of tax behaviour is a 
key tool for clarification the mechanism of functioning of incentives for economic 
development of the country. Usually, by increasing taxes the government, ceteris 
paribus, aims to raise budget revenue. Reducing the tax burden it induces the 
additional investment inflow caused by improvement of economic environment. 
Under this fiscal aspect the government faces the contradiction between the need to 
fulfill budget and to improve the economic climate by means of adjustment of the tax 
burden. 
So, a government has three alternative variants of tax behaviour, namely, to 
reduce the tax rate in order to improve economic conditions and to attract new 
investors; to increase the tax rate as a way to raise budget revenue; or to fix the tax 
rate, i.e. refuse to use this tax instrument at all. 
The generally recent trend is decreasing of CIT rate. The analysis of CIT rate 
for 114 countries for which statistics are available from 2002 till 2018 (Corporate tax 
rates table, 2019) shows as for this time horizon the average CIT rate reduced by 
4,89%: from 27,86% to 22,73% (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1. CIT change in world countries from 2002 until 2018 years 
 
Source: (Corporate tax rates table, 2018); authors’ calculations 
The number of countries in the sample are from 101 in 2002 and 2003 years to 
148 in 2016-2018 years 
 
It shows that governments use not only the financial component, but also the 
regulator when choosing their tax decisions. Certainly there are many factors 
influencing the choice of governments, but can assume in generally government tax 
behaviour is based on analysis of macro-economic indicators. It is a main hypothesis 
of this research. Therefore the purpose of research is check dependence of 
government tax behaviour on selected indicators. 
 
Literature review 
The theme financial behaviour, in particular, tax behaviour was taken up by (O. 
Weber, J. Fooken, B. Herrmann), (A. Krishna, J. Slemrod), (A. Laffer, W. 
Winegarden, J. Childs), who specifically investigated the issue of tax regulation to 
optimize the economic activity of agents. 
The government tax behaviour 
The large part of researches focused on the patterns of government tax 
behaviour in different economic conditions. 
Mirrlees et al. (2011) in the final report from the Mirrlees Review “Tax by 
design” developed some important patterns of the government’s tax behaviour, 
notably, they underlined the central role of redistribution in the tax and benefit 
system and the importance of maintaining neutrality. 
Weber et al. (2014) investigated government behaviour and taxation. They 
found that behavioural economic factors can significantly influence tax compliance, 
and if well applied, usually cause an increase in compliance; these behavioural 
factors affect decision-making in ways that are important for making good tax policy. 
Another set of papers studies the aspects of government behaviour influenced 
by different institutional factors. Thus, Krishna & Slemrod (2003) analyzed the tax 
behaviour of the government aiming to minimize the perceived burden addressing 
particularly to the ethical and normative implications of price presentation in the tax 
system. Avi-Yonah (2011) found general conditions under which taxation as 
regulation makes sense: it should apply to small numbers of taxpayers; the taxpayers 
are sophisticated and able to deal with complex tax incentive and the regulatory goal 
is clear and related to the level of the tax. 
Leicester et al. (2012) analyzed behavioural aspects of government’s tax and 
benefit policy intervention taking into account such behavioural insights like bounded 
rationality, framing, time inconsistency, social preferences, etc. 
The administrative techniques and institutions for the management of tax 
complexity were investigated by Freedman (2015). She concluded that institutions 
can also improve tax systems and sometimes reduce complexity, but this 
simplification will only be achieved if the institutions are conceptually coherent with 
clear tax policy objectives. 
Pecorino (1995) investigated tax rates and tax revenues in a model of growth 
through human capital accumulation. The relationship between tax rates and the 
present value of tax collections is analyzed in an endogenous growth setting. In such 
a model, income taxation may reduce the size of the tax base in current and future 
periods through both labor supply and growth rate effects. 
Laffer et al. (2011) estimated the economic burden caused by the Tax Code 
complexity. They outlined that the potential benefits to economic growth could be 
from a reduction in tax complexity. Under the establishment of the low rate flat tax 
on a broad tax base, the inefficiencies caused by Tax Code complexity, notably, 
administrative costs, time costs, and compliance costs would be substantially 
reduced. As a result, overall economic efficiency would increase, as well as the 
growth in income and wealth. 
Analysis of the mutual influence of CIT and FDI 
C. D. and D. H. Romer (2010) investigated the impact of tax changes on 
economic activity. The authors identified the size, timing, and principal motivation 
for all major postwar tax policy actions. It allows us to separate legislated changes 
into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those 
taken for more exogenous reasons. 
Schraztenstaller, Wagener, and Kohler-Toglhofer (2005), Feld and 
Heckemeyer (2008), etc. confirm the negative relation between corporate taxation 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. that lower tax rate represents stimulate the 
inflow of FDI and conversely. 
Becker (2009) confirms the corporate taxation increase results in a decrease in 
tax revenues because of the lower inflow of FDI into the economy. However, this 
statement does not always correspond to practical research. A more full outline of the 
issue is given by the model (Chalk, 2001) that analyzes a classical graphical model of 
conditions of increasing the tax revenue due to the reduction of the tax burden. This 
analytical model of the optimal tax burden is rather abstract; it is could be used in an 
arbitrary economic system. 
Other models of fiscal (notable tax) behaviour and the impact of tax changes 
on the state of the economy were considered, in particular, in the works of Wanniski, 
1978, Judd, 1985, Chamley, 1986, Laffer, 2004, Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011, Werning, 
2007). 
Afonso and Hauptmeier (2003) analyzed the determinants of government’s 
fiscal behaviour in EU countries. Their results show that the existence of effective 
fiscal rules, the degree of public spending decentralization, and the electoral cycle 
can impinge on the country’s fiscal position. 
In summary, we can conclude that current studies mainly investigate 
government tax behaviour (policy) from the standpoint of expediency of certain 
regulatory and adjustment measures. Any government considers its own economy as 
perfect or its own tax system as optimal. But at the same time by no means, all of 
them use the proposed instruments in order to improve the situation. 
The studies of the causes of this fact, which we evaluate as important, are not 
sufficiently covered in the existing literature. Notably, we consider the insufficiently 
exhaustive and clear answer about government tax behaviour when it chooses the 
direction of change of the tax burden in certain economic conditions. 
Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to determine factors and conditions, 
which influence on government’s decision related to the choice of a certain type of 
tax behaviour. This allowed us to set the following tasks: 
 to define a set of potential indicators, based on which the government makes a 
decision concerning certain economic (tax) behaviour; 
 to identify if such dependence in fact exists; 
 to analyze which indicators influence more over the government’s economic 
behaviour; 
 to define principles (nature) of the government response, i.e. under what 
conditions the government intend to increase the tax burden, to reduce it or to keep 
it at the same level; 
 to define the character of government behaviour. 
Data and methodology 
In the article we analyze the economic behaviour of governments of world 
countries, which for the purposes of study can be regarded as adjustment of the 
corporate tax burden. It should be noted that in some countries, like Germany, the 
CIT rates, established by local authorities, differ by region. In this case we used a 
weight-average tax burden, adjusted by some central government. 
Now the task is to examine the possible impact of the actual economic 
efficiency of the country on government’s economic behaviour (i.e. on the changes of 
tax rates). GDP is the generally accepted indicator of power of the economy in the 
context of the world economic system while GDP per capita could be considered as 
indicator of the wealth of the economy. 
The selection and rationale of indicators 
Governments resolve on change of CIT rate, i.e. we have tax behaviour. 
However because it is the behaviour of governments, that is, organizations, we 
do not consider the majority of indicators used by different theories of economic 
behaviour. 
The government uses macroeconomic indicators, therefore, the task arises to 
check, 
firstly, whether are government decisions independent of these indicators? 
second, if they are dependent on those indicators whether government 
behaviour is rational or not? 
It is generally admitted that Gross domestic product (GDP) calculated in one 
way or another is the best matched characteristic of the country economic power. As 
distinct from the power of the country’s economy, its wealth is determined by GDP, 
normalized to country population – GDP per capita. 
On the other hand, as already noted above, decrease of CIT rate is an 
instrument of improve the investment climate. Therefore is advisable to consider the 
eventual influence of the value FDI (nominal, per capita, & per GDP) to change of 
CIT rate. 
Sometimes it can find the name “investment attractiveness”, but then it is 
should talk about her absolute value, and for the normalized investment attractiveness 
should use derived indicator: ratio of FDI to GDP. In order to simplify the 
terminology for the last indicator we use the term “attractiveness of investment 
climate”. 
In a priori, we do not reject any of the above indicators for evaluate the 
efficiency (power, wealth) of economy. Further in order to evaluate the efficiency of 
economy (in terms of power and wealth) we provide the formal estimation of the 
correlation between the changes of CIT rates and each of the selected indicators. 
Rationale for sample 
The sample contains all world countries, for which statistics for GDP, FDI, and 
their populations were available at the moment of researching. 
The analysis of governments’ behaviour related to adjustment of the 
corporate tax burden in world countries 
In order to determine principles of the government’s behaviour we investigate 
the correlation between changes of CIT rates and five selected indicators, which 
could be considered as characteristics of country’s generalized economic efficiency: 
 GDP, 
 FDI, 
 GDP per capita, 
 FDI per capita, 
 FDI GDP . 
We explore the data for 13 years (2005-2017) for 114 world countries, because 
there is no reliable data for CIT rate for previous years. 
The CIT rate change is calculated as the difference between the last and first 
indicator values. 
The obtained results are presented in the Tables A1, A2 in Addition A. 
Methodology 
For confirmation or rejection of the independence hypothesis, we use a 
binomial asymptotic confidence interval for the mean. Binomial distribution was 
chosen because 
 analyzed events – the change annual tax rates by countries – for each of 3 
investigated cases are discrete: the event (tax rate increase, tax rate decrease or 
invariance of tax rate) occurs or no; 
 it is assumed, the government of each country makes a decision regardless of the 
governments of other countries. We assume, governments of countries from 
different indicator’s values use different strategies, but each government uses a 
certain strategy. Therefore in the distribution of countries in the economy’s 
efficiency, we are following such requirements: 
 the union of a set of countries, that present economies of a certain efficiency 
level, covers the whole set (in this case – 114 world countries); 
 the intersection of a set of countries, that present economies of a certain 
efficiency level, the empty set; 
 since we rank countries by increasing the efficiency indicator of the economy 
(severally for every indicator), then, clearly, all economies that were classified as 
low-efficiency precede economies that were classified as mid- and high-
efficiency level; economies that were classified as mid-efficiency precede 
economies that were classified as high-level. I.e. at first there are all low-
efficiency economies located, then – mid-efficiency ones, finally – high-
efficiency economies ones. 
It’s formally, 
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If so, the deviation of the actual number of sample elements confirming the 
trend does not go beyond the statistical error; 
otherwise, then is likely dependence of indicator from sample parameters, that 
is government tax behaviour of countries, that got to the sample, differs from 
generalized for all OECD countries. 
So, not to confirm the independence hypothesis it is enough to find 
distribution, for which the number of economies in the sample, that follow a certain 
trend, falls outside the limits of a confidence interval for the independent hypothesis 
for the corresponding value of the quantile (usually, 0,95). 
The cumulative hypothesis dependence test 
Finding of a partition of the totality of world countries for which the number of 
countries at each of the efficiency levels that follow a given trend lies beyond the 
confidence interval, already suggests that government tax behaviour is not 
independent of the efficiency. 
This can be considered a local task. However, it cannot be excluded the 
partition of a set is somewhat random and does not represent the overall trend. 
For this reason, we are testing the independence of government tax behaviour 
from the efficiency of each indicator for all possible distributions of government tax 
behaviour (“increase tax rate”, “keep tax rate” and “decrease tax rate”) by factor 
efficiency levels (low, middle, high). 
The presence of clusters of variants for which the independence of these factors 
is not confirmed improves the assurance of the hypothesis of dependence on these 
factors and shows the trend of government tax behaviour. 
All countries in the world can be divided for each of the 5 efficiency indicators 
into 3 sets: countries with low, medium and high efficiency. It should be noted that 
there is no fixed distribution, it is only clear that the sequence of countries, ordered 
by some efficiency indicator, begins with low-efficiency countries, continues with 
middle-efficiency countries and ends with high-efficiency countries. 
We assume if government tax behaviour of certain set of countries (with low, 
middle, or high efficiency of country’s economy) dependents from efficiency the 
countries of this set generally choose 1 from 3 options: increasing, decreasing, or 
keeping tax rate. Here, by “generally choose” we mean that the number of countries 
of the set which chosen such behaviour, fall outside the limits of 95% confidence 
interval for a binomial distribution. 
Let us set: 
 countries with low economic efficiency – low; 
 countries with middle economic efficiency – middle; 
 countries with high economic efficiency – high; 
 increase tax rate – increase; 
 decrease tax rate – decrease; 
 keep tax rate – keep. 
3 efficiency levels and 3 variants of tax behaviour give 6 variants of total 
behaviour of all countries of a set: 
 {low – increase, middle – keep, high – decrease}; 
 {low – increase, middle – decrease, high – keep}; 
 {low – keep, middle – increase, high – decrease}; 
 {low – keep, middle – decrease, high – increase}; 
 {low – decrease, middle – increase, high – keep}; 
 {low – decrease, middle – keep, high – increase}. 
Since if countries are ordered by efficiency, first follow countries with low 
efficiency, then – with middle one, and finally – with high one, later we for the sake 
of reduction omit “low” on 1st position, ”middle” – on 2nd one, “high” – on 3rd one, 
and kind of a behaviour reduces to 4 first letters: “incr”, “keep”, and “decr”. 
For each from 5 efficiency indicator, for each from 6 above variants, for all 
possible distributes of countries on low-, medium- and high-efficiency economies we 
are testing independence hypothesis of government tax behaviour from an efficiency 
of economy (i.e., we test, whether the number of countries that chosen such 
behaviour falls outside the limits of confidence interval or not). 
Formally, we are testing the independence hypothesis for  , ,l me bn ns , 
where 
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 :1i ls i n   – the set of low-efficiency countries; 
 : 1j l ms n j n    – the set of middle-efficiency countries; 
 : 1k ms n k N    – the set of high-efficiency countries. 
We fix the total non-confirmation of the independence hypothesis, if a large of 
each from 3 sets of countries fall outside the limits of confidence interval: low, 
middle, and high. 
 
  
Results 
The available statistics were considered regarding the above trends. I.e., we 
divided world countries and their data into three groups: 
1) countries, which reduced the corporate tax burden during 2005-2017, 
2) countries, which increased the corporate tax burden, and 
3) countries having a CIT rate in 2017 equal to the level of 2005. 
In addition, all countries were arranged by each of five indicators. 
The obtained results are presented in the Tables A3-A7. 
The indicators GDP, FDI, GDP per capita, FDI per capita, FDI/GDP in tables 
A3-A7 are ranked in ascending order. 
From the Tables A3-A7 it can be seen that during 13 last years 69 countries 
have reduced the CIT rates (the 1st group), 39 countries have not made any changes 
(2nd group) and 16 countries have increased the rates (the 3rd group). For each of these 
groups, we statistically tested the hypotheses about the independence of selected 
efficiency indicators and the CIT rate. The essence of testing was as follows. 
There were checked all possible combinations 3 above behavioural types and 3 
world countries groups with different values of efficiency indicators: countries with 
high, middle (intermediate) and low efficiency. 
We divided world countries into three groups according to values of their 
efficiency indicators: countries with high, middle (intermediate) and low efficiency. 
In order to confirm assumption about the relationship between the trend of the 
change of the CIT rate and certain efficiency indicator, the number of economies in 
the corresponding groups should be in the 95% confidence interval. 
The results are presented in Table 1. 
I.e. that can select such distributions of world countries by efficiency and 
government tax behaviour that for all world countries almost all of the hypotheses for 
independence between the trend of changes of the CIT tax rates and values of 
efficiency indicators (14 of 15, 93,3%) will be rejected with 0,95 probability. 
This shows that there is an interrelation between changes of the corporate tax 
burden and economic efficiency of countries according to all measurement methods. 
Table no. 1 – The results of the statistical independence hypothesis test of 
changes CIT rate on indicators efficiency of economics 
Indicator 
number of countries in the 
sample meets the criteria 
C.I. (95%) 
The tax change increase 
Number of countries meets the criteria: 14 of 114 
high GDP 4 of 21 [1,31; 3,84] 
middle FDI 5 of 27 [1,69; 4,94] 
high GDP per capita 7 of 31 [1,94; 5,68] 
high FDI per capita 2 of 10 [0,63; 1,83] 
high FDI/GDP 3 of 26 [1,62; 4,76] 
The tax change keep 
Number of countries meets the criteria: 38 of 114 
low GDP 19 of 35 [8,64; 14,70] 
low FDI 20 of 38 [9,38; 15,95] 
low GDP per capita 20 of 45 [11,11; 18,89] 
middle FDI per capita 17 of 31 [7,65; 13,02] 
middle FDI/GDP 14 of 30 [7,40; 12,60] 
The tax change decrease 
Number of countries meets the criteria: 62 of 114 
middle GDP 41 of 58 [26,24; 36,85] 
high FDI 32 of 48 [21,72; 30,49] 
middle GDP per capita 27 of 38 [17,19; 24,14] 
low FDI per capita 47 of 73 [33,03; 46,38] 
low FDI/GDP 35 of 58 [26,24; 36,85] 
Source: author’s calculations 
The obtained conclusion provides an answer to one of the tasks of our study 
which concerns the implicit dependency between government tax behaviour and each 
of five indicators of the economic efficiency for world countries. 
The total testing was done for 30 variants (5 efficiency indicators × 6 
sequences of government tax behaviour). 
Each variant contains   2 1 122 123 15006N N      possible combination 
of low-efficiency, middle-efficiency, and high-efficiency economies. 
Table 2 shows for each option the number of cases of non-confirmation the 
independence hypothesis. 
Table 2 – The number of non-confirmation the independence hypothesis for 
every efficiency indicators and total government tax behaviour 
the economy’s efficiency 
GDP FDI 
GDP per 
capita 
FDI per 
capita 
FDI
GDP
 
low middle high 
increase decrease keep 59 47 0 42 0 
increase keep decrease 0 0 0 0 0 
decrease increase keep 337 604 152 14 0 
decrease keep increase 0 0 0 0 0 
keep increase decrease 0 0 0 0 0 
keep decrease increase 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Fig. 2. Results of cumulative testing of the hypothesis of independence of 
government tax behaviour from GDP per capita for the case of total behaviour 
{low – keep, middle – decrease, high – increase} 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
axis of abscissas – the last number of low level 
axis of ordinates – the last elements of middle level 
 
Fig. 4. Results of cumulative testing of the hypothesis of independence of 
government tax behaviour from GDP for the case of total behaviour {low – keep, 
middle – decrease, high – increase} 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
axis of abscissas – the last number of low level 
axis of ordinates – the last elements of middle level 
 
Fig. 5. Results of cumulative testing of the hypothesis of independence of 
government tax behaviour from FDI for the case of total behaviour {low – keep, 
middle – decrease, high – increase} 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
axis of abscissas – the last number of low level 
axis of ordinates – the last elements of middle level 
 
  
 Discussion 
Table no. 9 shows for the indicator FDI GDP  there is no total non-
confirmation of the independence hypothesis for any of 6 variants. For each from 
other 4 indicators there are 7 total non-confirmations of the independence hypothesis, 
namely: 
 {increase, keep, decrease} and {keep, increase, decrease} for GDP; 
 {increase, keep, decrease} and {keep, increase, decrease} for FDI; 
 {keep, increase, decrease} for GDP per capita; 
 {increase, keep, decrease} and {keep, increase, decrease} for FDI per capita. 
Such an availability of 7 options, each contains distributions for which the 
independence hypothesis is not confirmed, tends to think that for the 4 efficiency 
indicators there is interdependence between the corporate tax rate change and the 
country's economic indicators. This conclusion resolves one of the study issues: it is 
the unconditional dependence between government tax behaviour and each of the 4 
indicators of the economy’s efficiency of the world countries. 
As can see from Table no. 9 and Fig. 2-4, there are three options with a large of 
independence hypothesis non-confirmations: 
 {low – keep, middle – increase, high – decrease} for GDP; 
 {low – keep, middle – increase, high – decrease} for FDI; 
 {low – keep, middle – increase, high – decrease} for GDP per capita. 
I.e., in each of these cases for each of 3 indicators: GDR per capita, GDR, and 
FDI, governments apply the same strategy, and so, low-efficient countries keep tax 
rates, middle-efficient countries increase tax rates, and high-efficient countries 
decrease tax rates for any of 3 efficient indicators: GDR per capita, GDR, and FDI. 
Comparison of results of the analysis for of the totality of world countries with 
the similar analysis for OECD countries (Sokolovskyi, 2018) shows: 
 the dependence of government tax behaviour on economy’s efficiency holds in 
both cases; 
 in both cases government tax behaviours is not like a maximizer behaviour; 
 however, if OECD countries act like satisfiers: they care about improving the 
economic climate and/or the budget filling, if there are difficulties with these 
indexes, 
 then the behaviour of world countries it cannot be considered the behaviour of a 
satisfier. But in any case, it is not a maximizer’s behaviour. 
This evidences the stability of the priorities of governments of world countries 
to choose tax behaviour: in each of the above 3 cases for any efficiency indicator, the 
same multi-strategy is used what clearly demonstrates the dependence of government 
behaviour on the efficiency of the country's economy. I.e., the economy's efficiency 
is the main factor in decision-making to decrease, increase, or keep the tax burden. 
It is widely believed among economists are of the opinion that one of the 
means of improving the economic climate and attracting additional investment is to 
reduce the tax burden. From this point of view, the above government tax behaviour 
is not rational: taxes are reduced by countries that already have the highest FDI and 
highest GDP. Consequently, it should search for other factors that explain the trend of 
government tax behaviour. 
Conclusion 
1. In order to study government tax behaviour, the factors and conditions 
determining the decision-making, we analyzed its possible correlation with set of 
indicators of efficiency of economies, based on GDP and FDI, nominal and per 
capita, as well as the ratio of FDI to GDP. 
2. There were used statistical analysis methods to found the statistical relationship 
between government behaviour and each of the selected indicators. For 
confirmation or rejection of the independence hypothesis was used binomial 
asymptotic confidence interval for the mean. 
3. To get the aggregate view, it was testing the independence hypothesis for each 
indicator of efficiency, for all possible distributes on low-, medium- and high-
efficiency economies, and for all possible options of application of tax behaviour 
strategies by indicated economic groups. 
4. The analysis allowed us to divide the all countries of world into three groups 
according their tax behaviour: that increase their CIT tax burden, that reduce it and 
that does not use the tax instruments, notably, in order to attract the foreign 
investors. 
5. It found the correlation between the government’s tax behaviour (defined as the 
difference between corporate tax burden at the beginning and the end of period) 
and each of selected indicators. 
6. It is found, government’s tax behaviour depends the most systemically on the 
indicators as GDP per capita, GDP and FDI, and in all of these cases, the same 
statistically confirmed trend is observed (invariance of CIT tax rate for the least 
efficient economies, increase CIT tax rate for economies with average efficiency 
and decrease CIT tax rate for the most efficient economies). 
7. This evidences the stability of the priorities of governments of world countries to 
choose tax behaviour. The main factor in deciding whether to decrease, increase or 
keep the tax burden is the economy's efficiency. 
8. However, in general there is a trend related to the reduction of the tax burden, 
which can be considered not only as intention to attract the new investment, but 
also as the fight for investors. Under specific conditions such fight could lead to a 
“race to the bottom” situation, i.e. to the inefficient state of all economic systems 
participated in this race. Thus, determining the reasons, factors and conditions 
favoring the race to the bottom between different countries require the further 
investigation. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. CIT rates in world countries, 2005-2017 yr. 
Country 2005 yr. 2017 yr. Changes of CIT rates,  (2017 – 2005), yrs. 
Afghanistan 0 0,2 0,2 
Albania 0,2 0,15 –0,05 
Algeria 0,25 0,26 0,01 
Angola 0,35 0,3 –0,05 
Argentina 0,35 0,3 –0,05 
Armenia 0,2 0,2 0 
Australia 0,3 0,3 0 
Austria 0,25 0,25 0 
Bahamas, The 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 0,3 0,25 –0,05 
Barbados 0,25 0,3 0,05 
Belarus 0,24 0,18 –0,06 
Belgium 0,3399 0,29 –0,05 
Bolivia 0,25 0,25 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,1 0,1 0 
Botswana 0,25 0,22 –0,03 
Brazil 0,34 0,34 0 
Bulgaria 0,15 0,1 –0,05 
Cambodia 0,2 0,2 0 
Canada 0,361 0,265 –0,096 
Chile 0,17 0,26 0,09 
China 0,33 0,25 –0,08 
Colombia 0,35 0,33 –0,02 
Costa Rica 0,3 0,3 0 
Croatia 0,2 0,18 –0,02 
Czech Republic 0,24 0,19 –0,05 
Denmark 0,28 0,22 –0,06 
Dominican Republic 0,3 0,27 –0,03 
Ecuador 0,25 0,25 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0,2 0,23 0,03 
El Salvador 0,3 0,3 0 
Estonia 0,23 0,2 –0,03 
Finland 0,26 0,2 –0,06 
France 0,3333 0,33 –0,003 
Georgia 0,15 0,15 0 
Germany 0,3834 0,3 –0,083 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country 2005 yr. 2017 yr. Changes of CIT rates,  (2017 – 2005), yrs. 
Ghana 0,25 0,25 0 
Greece 0,29 0,29 0 
Honduras 0,3 0,25 –0,05 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0,175 0,165 –0,01 
Hungary 0,16 0,09 –0,07 
Iceland 0,18 0,2 0,02 
India 0,3366 0,35 0,0134 
Indonesia 0,3 0,25 –0,05 
Ireland 0,125 0,125 0 
Israel 0,31 0,23 –0,08 
Italy 0,3725 0,24 –0,133 
Jamaica 0,3333 0,25 –0,083 
Japan 0,4069 0,3086 –0,098 
Jordan 0,25 0,2 –0,05 
Kazakhstan 0,3 0,2 –0,1 
Kenya 0,3 0,3 0 
Korea, Rep. 0,275 0,25 –0,025 
Kuwait 0,55 0,15 –0,4 
Latvia 0,15 0,2 0,05 
Lebanon 0,15 0,15 0 
Lithuania 0,15 0,15 0 
Luxembourg 0,2963 0,2601 –0,036 
Macao SAR, China 0,12 0,12 0 
Macedonia, FYR 0,15 0,1 –0,05 
Malawi 0,3 0,3 0 
Malaysia 0,28 0,24 –0,04 
Malta 0,35 0,35 0 
Mauritius 0,25 0,15 –0,1 
Mexico 0,29 0,3 0,01 
Montenegro 0,09 0,09 0 
Morocco 0,3 0,31 0,01 
Mozambique 0,32 0,32 0 
Namibia 0,34 0,32 –0,02 
Netherlands 0,296 0,25 –0,046 
New Zealand 0,33 0,28 –0,05 
Nigeria 0,3 0,3 0 
Norway 0,28 0,23 –0,05 
Oman 0,12 0,15 0,03 
Pakistan 0,35 0,3 –0,05 
  
Continue of Table A1 
Country 2005 yr. 2017 yr. Changes of CIT rates,  (2017 – 2005), yrs. 
Panama 0,3 0,25 –0,05 
Paraguay 0,1 0,1 0 
Peru 0,3 0,295 –0,005 
Philippines 0,35 0,3 –0,05 
Poland 0,19 0,19 0 
Portugal 0,275 0,21 –0,065 
Qatar 0,35 0,1 –0,25 
Romania 0,16 0,16 0 
Russian Federation 0,24 0,2 –0,04 
Saudi Arabia 0,2 0,2 0 
Serbia 0,1 0,15 0,05 
Sierra Leone 0,3 0,3 0 
Singapore 0,2 0,17 –0,03 
Slovak Republic 0,19 0,21 0,02 
Slovenia 0,25 0,19 –0,06 
South Africa 0,3689 0,28 –0,089 
Spain 0,35 0,25 –0,1 
Sri Lanka 0,325 0,28 –0,045 
Sudan 0,35 0,35 0 
Suriname 0,36 0,36 0 
Sweden 0,28 0,22 –0,06 
Switzerland 0,213 0,18 –0,033 
Tanzania 0,3 0,3 0 
Thailand 0,3 0,2 –0,1 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,25 0,25 0 
Tunisia 0,35 0,25 –0,1 
Turkey 0,2 0,22 0,02 
Uganda 0,3 0,3 0 
Ukraine 0,25 0,18 –0,07 
United Arab Emirates 0,55 0,55 0 
United Kingdom 0,3 0,19 –0,11 
United States 0,4 0,27 –0,13 
Uruguay 0,3 0,25 –0,05 
Vanuatu 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0,28 0,2 –0,08 
Yemen, Rep. 0,35 0,2 –0,15 
Zambia 0,35 0,35 0 
Zimbabwe 0,309 0,25 –0,059 
Source: (Corporate tax rates table, 2018); authors’ calculations  
Table A2. Based macro-economic factors in world countries, 2017 yr., $bn 
Country GDP FDI GDP per 
capita 
FDI per 
capita 
FDI
GDP
 
Afghanistan 19544 53 550,068 1,503 0,003 
Albania 13039 1022 4537,579 355,715 0,078 
Algeria 167555 1201 4055,247 29,066 0,007 
Angola 122124 –7397 4100,290 –248,363 –0,061 
Argentina 637430 11517 14398,359 260,144 0,018 
Armenia 11537 250 3936,798 85,229 0,022 
Australia 1323421 42580 53799,938 1730,958 0,032 
Austria 416596 15608 47290,912 1771,783 0,037 
Bahamas, The 12162 595 30762,012 1504,940 0,049 
Bahrain 35307 519 23655,036 347,641 0,015 
Bangladesh 249724 2151 1516,513 13,065 0,009 
Barbados 4674 286 16356,980 1001,534 0,061 
Belarus 54456 1276 5727,512 134,236 0,023 
Belgium 492681 –39482 43323,807 –3471,865 –0,080 
Bolivia 37509 725 3393,956 65,570 0,019 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 18055 463 5148,209 131,945 0,026 
Botswana 17407 401 7595,611 174,795 0,023 
Brazil 2055506 70685 9821,408 337,740 0,034 
Bulgaria 58221 2182 8227,960 308,384 0,037 
Cambodia 22158 2788 1384,423 174,197 0,126 
Canada 1653043 27526 45032,120 749,852 0,017 
Chile 277076 6419 15346,450 355,507 0,023 
China 12237700 168224 8826,994 121,339 0,014 
Colombia 314458 14013 6408,920 285,605 0,045 
Costa Rica 57286 2856 11677,269 582,173 0,050 
Croatia 55213 2040 13382,720 494,573 0,037 
Czech Republic 215726 9210 20368,139 869,587 0,043 
Denmark 324872 2357 56307,508 408,585 0,007 
Dominican Republic 75932 3597 7052,259 334,095 0,047 
Ecuador 104296 618 6273,489 37,199 0,006 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 235369 7392 2412,727 75,771 0,031 
El Salvador 24805 331 3889,309 51,885 0,013 
Estonia 25921 1555 19704,655 1182,220 0,060 
Finland 251885 14198 45703,328 2576,145 0,056 
France 2582501 47336 38476,659 705,253 0,018 
Georgia 15081 1830 4057,286 492,301 0,121 
Germany 3677439 77983 44469,909 943,024 0,021 
Ghana 58997 3255 2046,110 112,889 0,055 
  
Continue of Table A2 
Country GDP FDI GDP per 
capita 
FDI per 
capita 
FDI
GDP
 
Greece 200288 3571 18613,424 331,889 0,018 
Honduras 22979 1265 2480,126 136,489 0,055 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 341449 122401 46193,615 16559,257 0,358 
Hungary 139135 –13484 14224,846 –1378,526 –0,097 
Iceland 23909 –7017 70056,873 –20560,252 –0,293 
India 2600818 39966 1942,097 29,844 0,015 
Indonesia 1015539 21465 3846,864 81,308 0,021 
Ireland 333731 –3436 69330,690 –713,806 –0,010 
Israel 350851 18169 40270,251 2085,407 0,052 
Italy 1934798 9235 31952,976 152,518 0,005 
Jamaica 14781 886 5114,041 306,449 0,060 
Japan 4872137 18838 38428,097 148,578 0,004 
Jordan 40068 2030 4129,752 209,199 0,051 
Kazakhstan 162887 4654 9030,384 258,028 0,029 
Kenya 79263 671 1594,835 13,511 0,008 
Korea, Rep. 1530751 17053 29742,839 331,340 0,011 
Kuwait 120126 113 29040,364 27,321 0,001 
Latvia 30264 1138 15594,286 586,204 0,038 
Lebanon 53577 2559 8808,589 420,681 0,048 
Lithuania 47168 1191 16680,678 421,055 0,025 
Luxembourg 62404 6623 104103,037 11048,041 0,106 
Macao SAR, China 50361 –1642 80892,821 –2636,900 –0,033 
Macedonia, FYR 11280 381 5414,615 182,770 0,034 
Malawi 6303 277 338,484 14,881 0,044 
Malaysia 314710 9512 9951,544 300,772 0,030 
Malta 12518 3462 26903,825 7439,977 0,277 
Mauritius 13266 293 10490,504 231,415 0,022 
Mexico 1150888 32127 8910,333 248,731 0,028 
Montenegro 4845 560 7782,840 900,107 0,116 
Morocco 109709 2680 3007,243 73,465 0,024 
Mozambique 12646 2319 426,222 78,165 0,183 
Namibia 13254 591 5230,772 233,151 0,045 
Netherlands 826200 316541 48223,155 18475,698 0,383 
New Zealand 205853 2144 42940,578 447,332 0,010 
Nigeria 375745 3497 1968,426 18,321 0,009 
Norway 398832 1643 75504,566 310,956 0,004 
Oman 72643 2918 15668,367 629,403 0,040 
Pakistan 304952 2815 1547,853 14,288 0,009 
  
Continue of Table A2 
Country GDP FDI GDP per 
capita 
FDI per 
capita 
FDI
GDP
 
Panama 62284 4826 15196,397 1177,577 0,077 
Paraguay 39667 507 5823,766 74,438 0,013 
Peru 211389 6769 6571,929 210,458 0,032 
Philippines 313595 10057 2988,953 95,859 0,032 
Poland 526466 10673 13863,178 281,047 0,020 
Portugal 217571 10023 21136,297 973,697 0,046 
Qatar 166929 986 63249,422 373,592 0,006 
Romania 211884 5953 10817,834 303,929 0,028 
Russian Federation 1577524 28557 10743,097 194,479 0,018 
Saudi Arabia 686738 1421 20849,291 43,150 0,002 
Serbia 41432 2879 5900,038 409,956 0,069 
Sierra Leone 3775 560 499,529 74,101 0,148 
Singapore 323907 63633 57714,297 11338,305 0,196 
Slovak Republic 95769 5922 17604,951 1088,556 0,062 
Slovenia 48770 1082 23597,292 523,469 0,022 
South Africa 348872 1372 6151,078 24,189 0,004 
Spain 1311320 6204 28156,816 133,207 0,005 
Sri Lanka 87357 1375 4073,737 64,116 0,016 
Sudan 117488 1065 2898,549 26,282 0,009 
Suriname 2996 159 5317,390 281,763 0,053 
Sweden 538040 31531 53442,008 3131,867 0,059 
Switzerland 678887 37864 80189,697 4472,459 0,056 
Tanzania 52090 1180 936,331 21,214 0,023 
Thailand 455303 8046 6595,004 116,538 0,018 
Trinidad and Tobago 22079 –422 16126,371 –308,511 –0,019 
Tunisia 39952 810 3464,417 70,212 0,020 
Turkey 851549 10886 10546,153 134,819 0,013 
Uganda 25995 699 606,468 16,319 0,027 
Ukraine 112154 2827 2639,824 66,540 0,025 
United Arab Emirates 382575 10354 40698,849 1101,496 0,027 
United Kingdom 2622434 64685 39720,443 979,751 0,025 
United States 19390604 354828 59531,662 1089,368 0,018 
Uruguay 56157 –878 16245,598 –254,087 –0,016 
Vanuatu 863 25 3123,615 89,430 0,029 
Vietnam 223780 14100 2342,244 147,581 0,063 
Yemen, Rep. 31268 –270 1106,804 –9,552 –0,009 
Zambia 25868 866 1513,276 50,655 0,033 
Zimbabwe 22041 247 1333,396 14,954 0,011 
Source: (World Development Indicators, 2018); authors’ calculations  
Table A3. Ratios of the GDP indicators to the change of CIT rates in world 
countries (in the order of increasing of GDP), $bn 
GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
863 0,000 50361 0,000 313595 –0,050 
2996 0,000 52090 0,000 314458 –0,020 
3775 0,000 53577 0,000 314710 –0,040 
4674 0,050 54456 –0,060 323907 –0,030 
4845 0,000 55213 –0,020 324872 –0,060 
6303 0,000 56157 –0,050 333731 0,000 
11280 –0,050 57286 0,000 341449 –0,010 
11537 0,000 58221 –0,050 348872 –0,089 
12162 0,000 58997 0,000 350851 –0,080 
12518 0,000 62284 –0,050 375745 0,000 
12646 0,000 62404 –0,036 382575 0,000 
13039 –0,050 72643 0,030 398832 –0,050 
13254 –0,020 75932 –0,030 416596 0,000 
13266 –0,100 79263 0,000 455303 –0,100 
14781 –0,083 87357 –0,045 492681 –0,050 
15081 0,000 95769 0,020 526466 0,000 
17407 –0,030 104296 0,000 538040 –0,060 
18055 0,000 109709 0,010 637430 –0,050 
19544 0,200 112154 –0,070 678887 –0,033 
22041 –0,059 117488 0,000 686738 0,000 
22079 0,000 120126 –0,400 826200 –0,046 
22158 0,000 122124 –0,050 851549 0,020 
22979 –0,050 139135 –0,070 1015539 –0,050 
23909 0,020 162887 –0,100 1150888 0,010 
24805 0,000 166929 –0,250 1311320 –0,100 
25868 0,000 167555 0,010 1323421 0,000 
25921 –0,030 200288 0,000 1530751 –0,025 
25995 0,000 205853 –0,050 1577524 –0,040 
30264 0,050 211389 –0,005 1653043 –0,096 
31268 –0,150 211884 0,000 1934798 –0,133 
35307 0,000 215726 –0,050 2055506 0,000 
37509 0,000 217571 –0,065 2582501 –0,003 
39667 0,000 223780 –0,080 2600818 0,013 
39952 –0,100 235369 0,030 2622434 –0,110 
40068 –0,050 249724 –0,050 3677439 –0,083 
41432 0,050 251885 –0,060 4872137 –0,098 
47168 0,000 277076 0,090 12237700 –0,080 
48770 –0,060 304952 –0,050 19390604 –0,130 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table A4. Ratios of the GDP per capita indicators to the change of CIT 
rates in world countries (in the order of increasing of GDP per capita), $ 
GDP per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
GDP per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
GDP per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
338,484 0,000 5317,390 0,000 18613,424 0,000 
426,222 0,000 5414,615 –0,050 19704,655 –0,030 
499,529 0,000 5727,512 –0,060 20368,139 –0,050 
550,068 0,200 5823,766 0,000 20849,291 0,000 
606,468 0,000 5900,038 0,050 21136,297 –0,065 
936,331 0,000 6151,078 –0,089 23597,292 –0,060 
1106,804 –0,150 6273,489 0,000 23655,036 0,000 
1333,396 –0,059 6408,920 –0,020 26903,825 0,000 
1384,423 0,000 6571,929 –0,005 28156,816 –0,100 
1513,276 0,000 6595,004 –0,100 29040,364 –0,400 
1516,513 –0,050 7052,259 –0,030 29742,839 –0,025 
1547,853 –0,050 7595,611 –0,030 30762,012 0,000 
1594,835 0,000 7782,840 0,000 31952,976 –0,133 
1942,097 0,013 8227,960 –0,050 38428,097 –0,098 
1968,426 0,000 8808,589 0,000 38476,659 –0,003 
2046,110 0,000 8826,994 –0,080 39720,443 –0,110 
2342,244 –0,080 8910,333 0,010 40270,251 –0,080 
2412,727 0,030 9030,384 –0,100 40698,849 0,000 
2480,126 –0,050 9821,408 0,000 42940,578 –0,050 
2639,824 –0,070 9951,544 –0,040 43323,807 –0,050 
2898,549 0,000 10490,504 –0,100 44469,909 –0,083 
2988,953 –0,050 10546,153 0,020 45032,120 –0,096 
3007,243 0,010 10743,097 –0,040 45703,328 –0,060 
3123,615 0,000 10817,834 0,000 46193,615 –0,010 
3393,956 0,000 11677,269 0,000 47290,912 0,000 
3464,417 –0,100 13382,720 –0,020 48223,155 –0,046 
3846,864 –0,050 13863,178 0,000 53442,008 –0,060 
3889,309 0,000 14224,846 –0,070 53799,938 0,000 
3936,798 0,000 14398,359 –0,050 56307,508 –0,060 
4055,247 0,010 15196,397 –0,050 57714,297 –0,030 
4057,286 0,000 15346,450 0,090 59531,662 –0,130 
4073,737 –0,045 15594,286 0,050 63249,422 –0,250 
4100,290 –0,050 15668,367 0,030 69330,690 0,000 
4129,752 –0,050 16126,371 0,000 70056,873 0,020 
4537,579 –0,050 16245,598 –0,050 75504,566 –0,050 
5114,041 –0,083 16356,980 0,050 80189,697 –0,033 
5148,209 0,000 16680,678 0,000 80892,821 0,000 
5230,772 –0,020 17604,951 0,020 104103,037 –0,036 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table A5. Ratios of the FDI indicators to the change of CIT rates in world 
countries (in the order of increasing of FDI), $bn 
FDI, 2017 
yr 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI, 2017 
yr 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI, 2017 
yr 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
–39482 –0,050 1082 –0,060 6419 0,090 
–13484 –0,070 1180 0,000 6623 –0,036 
–7397 –0,050 1191 0,000 7392 0,030 
–7017 0,020 1201 0,010 8046 –0,100 
–3436 0,000 1265 –0,050 9210 –0,050 
–1642 0,000 1276 –0,060 9235 –0,133 
–878 –0,050 1372 –0,089 9512 –0,040 
–422 0,000 1375 –0,045 10023 –0,065 
–270 –0,150 1421 0,000 10057 –0,050 
25 0,000 1555 –0,030 10354 0,000 
53 0,200 1643 –0,050 10673 0,000 
113 –0,400 1830 0,000 10886 0,020 
159 0,000 2030 –0,050 11517 –0,050 
247 –0,059 2040 –0,020 14013 –0,020 
250 0,000 2144 –0,050 14100 –0,080 
277 0,000 2151 –0,050 14198 –0,060 
286 0,050 2182 –0,050 15608 0,000 
293 –0,100 2319 0,000 17053 –0,025 
331 0,000 2357 –0,060 18169 –0,080 
381 –0,050 2559 0,000 18838 –0,098 
401 –0,030 2680 0,010 21465 –0,050 
463 0,000 2788 0,000 27526 –0,096 
507 0,000 2815 –0,050 28557 –0,040 
519 0,000 2827 –0,070 31531 –0,060 
560 0,000 2856 0,000 32127 0,010 
591 –0,020 2879 0,050 37864 –0,033 
595 0,000 2918 0,030 39966 0,013 
618 0,000 3255 0,000 42580 0,000 
671 0,000 3462 0,000 47336 –0,003 
699 0,000 3497 0,000 63633 –0,030 
725 0,000 3571 0,000 64685 –0,110 
810 –0,100 3597 –0,030 70685 0,000 
866 0,000 4654 –0,100 77983 –0,083 
886 –0,083 4826 –0,050 122401 –0,010 
986 –0,250 5922 0,020 168224 –0,080 
1022 –0,050 5953 0,000 316541 –0,046 
1065 0,000 6204 –0,100 354828 –0,130 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table A6. Ratios of the FDI per capita indicators to the change of CIT rates in 
world countries (in the order of increasing of FDI per capita), $ 
FDI per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI per 
capita, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
–20560,252 0,020 89,430 0,000 355,715 –0,050 
–3471,865 –0,050 95,859 –0,050 373,592 –0,250 
–2636,900 0,000 112,889 0,000 408,585 –0,060 
–1378,526 –0,070 116,538 –0,100 409,956 0,050 
–713,806 0,000 121,339 –0,080 420,681 0,000 
–308,511 0,000 131,945 0,000 421,055 0,000 
–254,087 –0,050 133,207 –0,100 447,332 –0,050 
–248,363 –0,050 134,236 –0,060 492,301 0,000 
–9,552 –0,150 134,819 0,020 494,573 –0,020 
1,503 0,200 136,489 –0,050 523,469 –0,060 
13,065 –0,050 147,581 –0,080 582,173 0,000 
13,511 0,000 148,578 –0,098 586,204 0,050 
14,288 –0,050 152,518 –0,133 629,403 0,030 
14,881 0,000 174,197 0,000 705,253 –0,003 
14,954 –0,059 174,795 –0,030 749,852 –0,096 
16,319 0,000 182,770 –0,050 869,587 –0,050 
18,321 0,000 194,479 –0,040 900,107 0,000 
21,214 0,000 209,199 –0,050 943,024 –0,083 
24,189 –0,089 210,458 –0,005 973,697 –0,065 
26,282 0,000 231,415 –0,100 979,751 –0,110 
27,321 –0,400 233,151 –0,020 1001,534 0,050 
29,066 0,010 248,731 0,010 1088,556 0,020 
29,844 0,013 258,028 –0,100 1089,368 –0,130 
37,199 0,000 260,144 –0,050 1101,496 0,000 
43,150 0,000 281,047 0,000 1177,577 –0,050 
50,655 0,000 281,763 0,000 1182,220 –0,030 
51,885 0,000 285,605 –0,020 1504,940 0,000 
64,116 –0,045 300,772 –0,040 1730,958 0,000 
65,570 0,000 303,929 0,000 1771,783 0,000 
66,540 –0,070 306,449 –0,083 2085,407 –0,080 
70,212 –0,100 308,384 –0,050 2576,145 –0,060 
73,465 0,010 310,956 –0,050 3131,867 –0,060 
74,101 0,000 331,340 –0,025 4472,459 –0,033 
74,438 0,000 331,889 0,000 7439,977 0,000 
75,771 0,030 334,095 –0,030 11048,041 –0,036 
78,165 0,000 337,740 0,000 11338,305 –0,030 
81,308 –0,050 347,641 0,000 16559,257 –0,010 
85,229 0,000 355,507 0,090 18475,698 –0,046 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table. A7. Ratios of the FDI GDP  indicators to the change of CIT rates in world 
countries (in the order of increasing of FDI GDP ) 
FDI/GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI/GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
FDI/GDP, 
2017 yr. 
Change of CIT 
rate (2017 – 
2005, yrs.) 
–0,2935 0,020 0,0178 0,000 0,0375 –0,050 
–0,0969 –0,070 0,0181 –0,050 0,0376 0,050 
–0,0801 –0,050 0,0181 –0,040 0,0402 0,030 
–0,0606 –0,050 0,0183 –0,130 0,0427 –0,050 
–0,0326 0,000 0,0183 –0,003 0,0440 0,000 
–0,0191 0,000 0,0193 0,000 0,0446 –0,020 
–0,0156 –0,050 0,0203 –0,100 0,0446 –0,020 
–0,0103 0,000 0,0203 0,000 0,0461 –0,065 
–0,0086 –0,150 0,0211 –0,050 0,0474 –0,030 
0,0009 –0,400 0,0212 –0,083 0,0478 0,000 
0,0021 0,000 0,0216 0,000 0,0489 0,000 
0,0027 0,200 0,0221 –0,100 0,0499 0,000 
0,0039 –0,098 0,0222 –0,060 0,0507 –0,050 
0,0039 –0,089 0,0227 0,000 0,0518 –0,080 
0,0041 –0,050 0,0230 –0,030 0,0530 0,000 
0,0047 –0,100 0,0232 0,090 0,0550 –0,050 
0,0048 –0,133 0,0234 –0,060 0,0552 0,000 
0,0059 –0,250 0,0244 0,010 0,0558 –0,033 
0,0059 0,000 0,0247 –0,110 0,0564 –0,060 
0,0072 0,010 0,0252 –0,070 0,0586 –0,060 
0,0073 –0,060 0,0252 0,000 0,0599 –0,083 
0,0085 0,000 0,0256 0,000 0,0600 –0,030 
0,0086 –0,050 0,0269 0,000 0,0612 0,050 
0,0091 0,000 0,0271 0,000 0,0618 0,020 
0,0092 –0,050 0,0279 0,010 0,0630 –0,080 
0,0093 0,000 0,0281 0,000 0,0695 0,050 
0,0104 –0,050 0,0286 –0,100 0,0775 –0,050 
0,0111 –0,025 0,0286 0,000 0,0784 –0,050 
0,0112 –0,059 0,0302 –0,040 0,1061 –0,036 
0,0128 0,000 0,0314 0,030 0,1157 0,000 
0,0128 0,020 0,0320 –0,005 0,1213 0,000 
0,0133 0,000 0,0321 –0,050 0,1258 0,000 
0,0137 –0,080 0,0322 0,000 0,1483 0,000 
0,0147 0,000 0,0335 0,000 0,1834 0,000 
0,0154 0,013 0,0338 –0,050 0,1965 –0,030 
0,0157 –0,045 0,0344 0,000 0,2765 0,000 
0,0167 –0,096 0,0370 –0,020 0,3585 –0,010 
0,0177 –0,100 0,0375 0,000 0,3831 –0,046 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
